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A Tale Involving the Magic Kingdom, Pirates,
and a Court's Broad Interpretation of
Common Carrier Liability
Chad A. Gerardi
I. INTRODUCTION
California Civil Code § 2168 provides, "[elvery one who offers
to the public to carry persons, property, or messages, excepting
only telegraphic messages, is a common carrier of whatever he [or
she] thus offers to carry."1 The common carrier designation car-
ries significant importance because operators are held to a height-
ened duty of utmost care and diligence rather than the ordinary
negligence duty of reasonable care under the circumstances.2
This standard, while simple conceptually, has proven difficult
in its application. When interpreting this statute, the California
courts have struggled with defining a common carrier.3 Guided by
the plain words of the statute, California courts initially inter-
preted "common carrier" to include railways,4 steamboats,5 and
stagecoaches. 6 Over time, the common carrier definition expanded
to include airplanes,7 buses,8 taxicabs,9 escalators, 10 elevators,"
mule trains,'12 and ski-lifts. 13 In Neubauer v. Disneyland, Inc.,'4
the United States District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia held that Disneyland amusement park rides fall within Cali-
1 CAL. Civ. CODE § 2168 (West Supp. 1998).
2 CAL. Civ. CODE § 2100 (West Supp. 1998) ("A carrier of persons for reward must use
the utmost care and diligence for their safe carriage ....- ).
3 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, vol. 6, §§ 767-773 (9th ed. 1988). See
also, Webster v. Ebright, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 714 (Ct. App. 1992) (operator of horseback rides
held to a duty of ordinary care); McIntyre v. Smoke Tree Ranch Stables, 23 Cal. Rptr. 339
(Ct. App. 1962) (operator of a mule train held to a duty of utmost care and diligence).
4 Kerigan v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 22 P. 677 (Cal. 1889); Cowden v. Pacific Coast S. S.
Co., 29 P. 873 (Cal. 1892).
5 See generally Metz v. California South R. Co., 24 P. 610 (Cal. 1890).
6 Fairchild v. Stage Co., 13 Cal. 599 (1859).
7 Smith v. O'Donnell, 12 P.2d 933 (Cal. 1932).
8 Lopez v. Southern Calif. Rapid Transit Dist., 710 P.2d 907 (Cal. 1985).
9 Larson v. Blue & White Cab Co., 75 P.2d 612 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938).
1o Hendershott v. Macy's, 322 P.2d 596 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
ii Parker v. Manchester Hotel Co., 85 P.2d 152 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938).
12 McIntyre v. Smoke Tree Ranch Stables, 23 Cal. Rptr. 339 (Ct. App. 1962).
13 Squaw Valley Ski Corp. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897 (Ct. App. 1992).
14 875 F. Supp. 672 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
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fornia's statutory definition of common carriers, thereby imposing
a heightened duty of care in transporting the public.
This note explains why the federal court in Neubauer inter-
prets California's common carrier statute too broadly. In doing so,
the court fails to adequately address California's common law and
the principles set forth in other jurisdictions relating to amuse-
ment park rides and common carrier liability. Section I discusses
common carrier liability in other jurisdictions, and then focuses on
California case law addressing this issue. Section II examines the
facts and decision rendered in Neubauer. In Section III, the Neu-
bauer opinion is compared to cases in other jurisdictions which
have established common law tests for determining whether
amusement rides are common carriers.
Section IV of this note concludes that existing case law does
not support the Neubauer court's overly formalistic interpretation
of California's common carrier statute. Moreover, under the
court's reasoning, the "common carrier" status may be applied to
virtually any amusement ride or device. Thus, Neubauer signifi-
cantly impacts the interests of owners and operators of amuse-
ment rides in California in terms of their exposure to common
carrier liability.
II. TRADITIONAL COMMON CARRIER LIABILITY
A. Across the Nation
Several jurisdictions define the duty of care owed by operators
of amusement park rides.15 Generally, amusement ride operators
are required to exercise a level of reasonable and ordinary care
under the circumstances.16 However, a few jurisdictions demand a
15 See, e.g., John Kimpflen, Duties and Liabilities as to Amusement Rides and Devices,
27A Am. Jua. 2d Entertainment and Sports Law § 90 et seq. (1996); Annotation, Liability of
Owner, Lessee, or Operator for Injury or Death on or near Loop-o-plane, Ferris Wheel, Mini-
ature Car, or Similar Rides, 86 A.L.R. 2d 350 (1962); Annotation, Liability to Patron of
Scenic Railway, Roller Coaster, or Miniature Railway, 66 A.L.R.2d 689 (1959).
16 See, e.g., Wright v. Midwest Old Settlers and Threshers Ass'n, 556 N.W.2d 808
(Iowa 1996) (train ride at an annual reunion event held not a common carrier); Deutsch v.
Chubb Group of Insurance Companies, 1995 WL 584394 (D. Colo. 1995) (white water raft-
ing operator held not a common carrier); Bregel v. Busch Entertainment Corp., 444 S.E.2d
718 (Va. 1994) (gondola ride, which carried passengers high above the amusement park,
held not a common carrier); Beavers v. Federal Insurance Co., 437 S.E.2d 881 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1994) (white water rafting operator held not a common carrier); Lamb v. B & B
Amusement Corp., 869 P.2d 926 (Utah 1993) (court held no error in jury instructions in
refusing to instruct a roller coaster ride was subject to the duty of a common carrier); Gun-
ther v. Smith, 553 A.2d 1314 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (hayride held not a common car-
rier); Harlan v. Six Flags over Georgia, Inc., 297 S.E.2d 468 (Ga. 1982) (vertical-type
merry-go-round held not a common carrier); Sergermeister v. Recreation Corp. of America,
314 So. 2d 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) ("Lover's Coach" ride was not equated to a common
carrier); Eliason v. United Amusement Co., 504 P.2d 94 (Or. 1972) (merry-go-round opera-
tor held not bound by a heightened degree of care); U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Brian,
337 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1964) (amusement park ride named the "Whizzer" held not a com-
mon carrier); Firszt v. Capital Park Realty Co., 120 A. 300 (Conn. 1923) ("aeroplane swing"
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higher duty of care comparable to that owed by a common
carrier. 7
Expounding on the breadth of the common carrier duty of
care, courts describe this duty as "the utmost caution characteris-
tic of very careful prudent men,"18 and "the highest degree of vigi-
lance, care, and precaution."19 As Prosser and Keaton state,
"[C]ommon carriers, who enter into an understanding toward the
public for the benefit of all those who wish to make use of their
services, must use great caution to protect passengers entrusted
to their care.... 20
The rationale behind imposing a heightened duty of care on
common carriers involves several factors. First, those who travel
on common carriers essentially surrender themselves to the car-
rier's care and custody.21 Secondly, these patrons waive their free-
dom of movement and actions while in the custody of a common
carrier. 22 As these carriers have the exclusive control of their de-
vices, courts have held common carriers to a higher standard than
a mere duty of ordinary care under the circumstances.23
B. California
California Civil Code § 2100 mandates that a common carrier
"use the utmost care and diligence for [a passenger's] safe car-
riage, must provide everything necessary for that purpose, and
ride held not a common carrier); Brennan v. Ocean View Amusement Co., 194 N.E. 911
(Mass. 1935) (roller coaster held not a common carrier).
17 See, e.g., Lyons v. Wagers, 404 S.W.2d 270 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966) (operator of
amusement ride known as the 'Merry Mixer" held to highest degree of care equivalent to
that of a common carrier); Lewis v. Buckskin Joe's, Inc., 396 P.2d 933 (Colo. 1964) (operator
of amusement park's stage-coach ride held to the highest duty of care-court did not deter-
mine if ride was a common carrier); Coaster Amusement Co. v. Smith, 194 So. 336 (Fla.
1940) (operator of roller coaster held to highest degree of care equivalent to that of a com-
mon carrier); Bibeau v. Fred W. Pearce Corp., 217 N.W. 374 (Minn. 1928) (operator of roller
coaster held to highest degree of care equivalent to that of a common carrier); Cooper v.
Winnwood Amusement Co., 55 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932) (operator of a roller coaster
held to the highest degree of care for passenger safety); Sands Springs Park v. Schrader,
198 P. 983 (Okla. 1921) (operator of a scenic railway held to the duty of highest care, skill
and diligence-court did not determine if ride was a common carrier).
18 Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U.S. 451, 456 (1880).
19 Orr v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 349 So. 2d 417, 419 (La. Ct. App. 1977).
20 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 34, at 209
(5th ed. 1984).
21 See, e.g., Lewis, 396 P.2d at 939 (passengers of stage-coach ride "had surrendered
themselves to the care and custody of the defendants; they had given up their freedom of
movement and actions; there was nothing they could do to cause or prevent the accident");
Lopez v. Southern Calif. Rapid Transit Dist., 710 P.2d 907, 912 (Cal. 1985) (passengers on
a transit bus are 'forced into very close physical contact with one another ... the means of
entering and exiting the bus are limited and under the exclusive control of the bus driver
... passengers have no control over who is admitted on the bus and, if trouble arises, are
wholly dependent upon the bus driver to summon help or provide a means of escape").
22 Lewis, 396 P.2d at 939; Lopez, 710 P.2d at 912.
23 Id.
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must exercise to that end a reasonable degree of skill."24 This
higher standard of care imposes additional duties on the carrier.
For example, common carriers have the added burden of protect-
ing passengers against assaults by fellow passengers, employees,
and other third persons,25 of collecting information after a mishap
in anticipation of litigation,26 and a greater duty of inspecting and
warning passengers of dangers.27
In Lopez v. Southern Calif Rapid Transit Dist. ,21 the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that Civil Code § 2100 imposes a duty on
a common carrier "to do all that human care, vigilance, and fore-
sight reasonably can do under the circumstances. 29 In Lopez, the
plaintiffs were injured after a group of juveniles engaged in a fight
on a transit bus. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant bus
company failed to take affirmative measures to protect passengers
from assaults by fellow passengers, especially since it had knowl-
edge of the potential for assaults on its buses.
The court found the argument persuasive and held that com-
mon carrier employees have an affirmative duty to use due care to
aid passengers who become ill or who are attacked by third par-
ties.3 0 The court reasoned that large numbers of strangers are
forced into close physical contact. Furthermore, the means of en-
tering and exiting a bus are limited and under the exclusive con-
trol of the driver. When trouble arises, the passengers are wholly
dependent on the driver to summon help or provide a means of
escape.31
Under California law, common carriers are thereby responsi-
ble for even the slightest degree of negligence. Prosser and Kea-
ton define this duty as "an absence of that degree of care and
vigilance which persons of extraordinary prudence and foresight
are accustomed to use, or in other words, a failure to exercise
great care."3 2 This heightened duty of care standard makes a com-
mon carrier vulnerable to negligence suits for which noncarriers,
under a duty of ordinary care, would not be held liable.
24 CAL. Civ. CODE § 2100 (West Supp 1998).
25 See, e.g., Berger v. Southern Pac. Co., 300 P.2d 170, 173-74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956)
(operator of train held to a duty to protect its passengers from assaults by its employees);
Lopez, 710 P.2d 907 (operator of transit bus held to a duty to protect passengers from as-
saults by fellow passengers or third parties).
26 De Vera v. Long Beach Pub. Transp. Co., 225 Cal. Rptr. 789 (Ct. App. 1986) (bus
company held to a duty to collect and preserve accident-related information for use in fu-
ture civil litigation).
27 Gray v. San Francisco, 20 Cal. Rptr. 894 (Ct. App. 1962) (operator of streetcar held
under a duty to inspect for potential dangers to passengers).
28 Lopez, 710 P.2d at 907.
29 Id. at 909.
30 Id. at 912.
31 Id.
32 PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 211.
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III. NEUBAUER v. DISN EYAND, INC.
A. The Alleged Facts and Procedural History
"Pirates of the Caribbean" is an underground flume-type boat
ride located in the New Orleans Square area of the Disneyland
theme park in Anaheim, California. Approximately forty guests
are loaded into each boat at a loading dock. The boats float along
a flume through the attraction. The boats travel down two short,
steep waterfall-type drops which take the boats from the loading
dock area at ground level, to the studio level underground. When
the guests arrive underground, they travel past a ghost ship and a
treasure lair, and then are treated to a show of audio-animatronic
pirates attacking a fort, pillaging a Caribbean town, chasing wo-
men with food,"3 enjoying a drunken celebration, and burning the
town to ashes. At the end of the ride, the boats are transported
back to ground level via a belt lift. Guests exit the ride at the
unloading dock which is directly across from the loading area.
One afternoon in June 1995, Gary and Donna Neubauer
boarded the Pirates of the Caribbean boat ride.14 The ride attend-
ants seated Gary and Donna in the rear seat of one of the boats. 5
While proceeding through the attraction, their boat slid down the
first waterfall drop and collided with another boat which was situ-
ated immediately in front of their boat. 6 After the collision, their
boat came to a stop near the bottom of the waterfall.37 Before
their boat had a chance to move forward, the next boat in line on
the attraction slid down the waterfall and collided with the Neu-
bauer boat from behind.38 The rear boat climbed onto the back of
the Neubauer boat, creating a substantial impact and splintering
the rear of the Neubauer boat. 9 As a consequence of the two colli-
sions, the couple sustained serious injuries.4
The Neubauer's filed suit against Disneyland, alleging negli-
gence as well as common carrier liability. Disneyland moved to
33 Prior to 1997, Disneyland's audio-animatronic pirates chased women. In response
to growing public concern, Disney modified the ride so that the pirates are now chasing
women with plates of food. In this age of political correctness, pirates are depicted in "hot
pursuit of a good meal rather than terrified village maidens." Marla Dickerson, Flap Over
'Pirates' Proves a Treasure Trove for Disney, L.A. TIMES, Metro Desk, Mar. 8, 1997 (1997
WL 2189333).
34 Complaint for Damages, Neubauer v. Disneyland, Inc., No. SACV94-841-GLT (C.D.
Cal. filed Sept. 16, 1994), at 3.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 4.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
4o The details of the injuries are not available. However, in their Complaint for Dam-
ages, the Neubauers prayed for $1,200,000.00 in general and special damages. They al-
leged "great mental, physical and nervous strain, pain and suffering .... [Elach of them,
were required to and did employ physicians and surgeons to examine, treat and care for
[them] ... ." Id. at 5, 9.
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dismiss the common carrier claim contending that, as a matter of
law, the Pirates of the Caribbean is not a common carrier.
B. The Court's Decision
Judge Taylor held in a short one-page opinion that the amuse-
ment park boat ride fell within California's statutory definition of
a common carrier." Consequently, the court held, pursuant to the
plaintiffs allegations and California Civil Code § 2100, "the duty
of utmost care and diligence would apply to Disneyland."42 As a
result, Disneyland's motion to dismiss the common carrier claim
was denied.43
The court elaborated on the broad scope of California Civil
Code § 2168 and concluded that this statutory definition includes
the broad category of amusement park rides." The court conceded
a reasonable argument could be made that the common carrier
status should not apply to amusement park rides.45 However, the
court reasoned it is the legislature's role to narrow the statute's
breadth, not the court's.46
In analyzing the scope of California's common carrier statute,
the court faced an issue of first impression. While the court stated
that courts nationwide have struggled with the degree of care
owed by amusement park operators,47 it noted that no California
court had directly ruled whether amusement rides are common
carriers pursuant to California's common carrier statute.' In its
analysis, the court analogized the facts of Neubauer to two earlier
rulings involving a ski-lift and a mule train.49
41 Neubauer v. Disneyland, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 672, 673 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 The court stated, "Some [jurisdictions] have held that common carrier liability is
appropriate, while others have concluded that a lesser standard of ordinary care is owed."
Neubauer, 875 F. Supp at 673.
48 In Barr v. Venice Giant Dipper Co., 32 P.2d 980 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934), the court held,
after examining case law in other jurisdictions, there was no error in the jury instructions
charging the operator of a miniature scenic railway with the utmost care and diligence
required of a common carrier. In Davidson v. Long Beach Pleasure Pier Co., 221 P.2d 1005
(Cal. Ct. App. 1950), the court held the operator of a tilt-a-whirl, described as a "merry-go-
round with a college education," was under a ordinary duty of reasonable care under the
circumstances in the maintenance, inspection, and supervision of the premises and amuse-
ments. The issue of common carrier liability was not addressed by the court. In Pontecorvo
v. Clark, 272 P. 591 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928), defense counsel conceded their roller coaster was
a common carrier without a decision by the court on this issue. And in Kohl v. Disneyland,
20 Cal. Rptr. 367 (Ct. App. 1962) the court merely described the "passenger-carrier" rela-
tionship when discussing res ipsa loquitur principles. At issue before the court was the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding, there was no negligence. The court did not
define the relationship of the parties involved in the case.
49 Neubauer, 875 F. Supp at 673.
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The California Court of Appeal, in McIntyre v. Smoke Tree
Ranch Stables,5" held a guided mule train, which carried passen-
gers along a fixed route from Palm Springs to Tahquitz Falls, was
a carrier.5 The court held the passengers paid a fare for a trip by
mule and the defendant stables offered to carry such passengers
for hire. Therefore, "the transaction between [the parties] consti-
tuted an agreement of carriage."52 Thus, the court ruled that jury
instructions charging the stables with the utmost care and dili-
gence should not have been refused. 3
Similarly, in Squaw Valley Ski Corp. v. Superior Court,,4 the
California Court of Appeal held a chair lift at a skiing resort was a
carrier.55 The court noted that a common carrier is "any entity
which holds itself out to the public generally and indifferently to
transport goods or patrons from place to place for profit."6 The
court held because the Squaw Valley Ski Corporation indiscrimi-
nately offered to carry skiers from the bottom to the top of the
mountain, the lift should be treated as a common carrier.5 7
IV. ANALYSIS OF NEUBAUER
The short, one-page opinion is too concise. The opinion fails to
address several major issues and distinctions that have developed
in determining what activities constitute a common carrier. The
court does not expound on the various tests used by other jurisdic-
tions in classifying common carriers. For example, the opinion
does not discuss the important distinction between common and
private carriers as discussed by Webster v. Ebright,5 a California
case decided just twenty-one days after Squaw Valley. 9 Nor does
the court lend significant weight to the legislative intent of the
common carrier statute enacted back in the days of horse and
steam locomotion. 0 Instead, the court allows the "common car-
rier" status to be conferred upon a wide variety of activities that
5o 23 Cal. Rptr. 339 (Ct. App. 1962).
51 Id. at 341.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 342
54 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897 (Ct. App. 1992).
55 Id. at 902.
56 Id. at 900.
57 Id.
58 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 714 (Ct. App. 1992).
59 In Webster v. Ebright, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 714, 717-20 (Ct. App. 1992), the court held
an operator of horseback rides, as a private carrier, was not subject to the heightened duty
of utmost care and diligence. The court distinguished between a common carrier and a
private carrier.
60 "When legislative intent cannot be discerned directly from the statutory language,
courts may look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the objects the statute seeks to
achieve or the evils it attempts to remedy, the legislative history, public policy, and the
statutory scheme of which the statute is a part." People v. woodhead, 239 Cal. Rptr. 656
(Cal. 1987).
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do not readily appear to be common carriers. Under the Neubauer
court's broad interpretation, an owner or operator of every amuse-
ment device from a pair of roller blades to a slide at a neighbor-
hood playground could conceivably be treated as a common
carrier.
As a case of first impression, the court should have relied
more on the principles set forth not only in California but in juris-
dictions across the country. A majority of jurisdictions deciding
the issue have determined amusement rides are not carriers of
any kind,6 and thus should not be held to the ordinary negligence
duty of reasonable care under the circumstances.2 While a few
jurisdictions have held amusement ride operators to a heightened
duty of care, most courts have not gone so far as to define amuse-
ment park rides as common carriers.6" Several tests have evolved
for determining whether an amusement ride or device rises to the
level of a common carrier. An examination of these tests, and the
principles underlying them, is instructive.
A. Carriage v. Entertainment
The Virginia Supreme Court, in Bregel v. Busch Entertain-
ment Corp.,6 considered the level of care an amusement park op-
erator owes its patrons. The amusement park ride in question
was the Skyride, a mono-cable gondola which traveled high above
the park.6 5 The court held an amusement park is not a common
carrier "because it does not, as a regular business, undertake for
hire to transport persons from place to place."' The court further
stated the Skyride, "is for entertainment purposes, and the trans-
portation function is incidental to the entertainment function.
Busch Entertainment's patrons do not pay admission to the park
to obtain transportation services; rather, they pay to be enter-
tained by amusement rides, shows, and other attractions."6 The
court distinguished amusement rides and devices from traditional
common carriers such as elevators. Unlike elevators, "Busch En-
tertainment's Skyride is used to entertain patrons at the amuse-
ment park, and any transportation function is purely incidental to
61 A "carrier" is one who undertakes to transport persons from place to place. See
generally Carriers, 13 Am. Jur. 2d § 1 et seq. (1964).
62 See cases cited supra note 16.
63 See cases cited supra note 17.
64 444 S.E.2d 718 (Va. 1994).
65 A patron was injured when her elbow, which was extended outside of the gondola's
cabin, was pinned between two gondolas that made contact. Bregel, 444 S.E.2d at 719.
66 Id.
67 Id.
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the amusement function."8 Thus, the court held the duty of ordi-
nary care applied to operators of the Skyride.69
Similarly, in Harlan v. Six Flags over Georgia,7 ° the Georgia
Supreme Court distinguished between traditional common carri-
ers and "The Wheelie," 71 an amusement ride at a Six Flags amuse-
ment park. Georgia had a broad common carrier statute
comparable to California's. 72  The court reasoned that persons
utilizing common carriers do so for transportation needs.73 On the
other hand, riders of "The Wheelie" "seek a sensation of speed and
movement for the sake of entertainment and thrills." 4 The court
stated:
We find it easy to distinguish between operation of elevators,
taxicabs, buses, and railroads, which are instruments of trans-
portation that must be used by people to travel from one place to
another, and operation of "The Wheelie" and similar instru-
ments, which are not. Passengers board elevators and amuse-
ment rides with dissimilar expectations. Persons using
ordinary transportation devices, such as elevators and buses,
normally expect to be carried safely, securely, and without inci-
dent to their destination. Amusement ride passengers intend to
be conveyed thrillingly to a place at, or near to, the point they
originally boarded, so the carriage is incidental. There is no
transport involved with "The Wheelie."75
The Supreme Court of Connecticut, in Firszt v. Capital Park
Realty Co., 76 also held the duty of ordinary care applied to an
amusement park ride known as the "aeroplane swing."77 Once
again, a clear distinction was drawn between common carriage
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 297 S.E.2d 468 (Ga. 1982)
71 "'The Wheelie' is an amusement device consisting of 21 cars mounted on the sprock-
ets of a wheel attached to a mechanical support arm, which is mounted in a concrete and
steel base. Patrons ride two or three to a car, and after the patrons are seated and the cars
are locked, the cars begin rotating on the wheel in a horizontal manner. As the rotational
speed increases, the support arm rises from its base and lifts the cars, still rotating, into a
near vertical position. In this position as the cars reach the top of the wheel, the cars and
riders are upside down, but held in position by centrifugal force. The wheel continues to
rotate in a near vertical position for a few seconds, and then the arm returns to a horizontal
position . . . ." Id. at 468.
72 GA. CODE ANN. § 18-204 provided "passengers [of common carriers] are those per-
sons who travel in some public conveyance by virtue of a contract, expressed or implied,
with the carrier as to the payment of the fare."
73 Harlan, 297 S.E.2d at 469.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 468.
76 Firszt v. Capital Park Realty Co., 120 A. 300 (Conn. 1923).
77 The ride consisted "of cars made to resemble aeroplanes, each of which cars accom-
modated four persons. Each person riding in one of said cars was charged 10 cents-gov-
ernment tax included. Each car was suspended by four steel cables, each fastened at one
end to each of the four corners of each swing respectively and at the other end to steel
supports or arms extending out from the top of a steel tower about 60 feet high." Id. at 301.
19981
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and entertainment. The court stated "one desiring for his delecta-
tion to make use of pleasure-giving devices similar to the one in
question is under no impulsion of business or personal necessity.
He is seeking entertainment, and, when invited ... he can prop-
erly ask only that he be not exposed by the carelessness of those in
charge of any given instrumentality ...."
In the present case, the sole, objective purpose of the Pirates
of the Caribbean and other amusement rides at Disneyland is en-
tertainment. The ride takes Disneyland patrons via boats
through an underground studio complete with audio-animatronic
pirates and fake treasure. The purpose of the ride is not to trans-
port passengers from place to place; it is to provide entertainment
and thrills. Disneyland patrons flock by the millions to the
amusement park in search of entertainment and escapism. The
Neubauer court could easily have applied the carriage versus en-
tertainment test to the facts of its case.
In Neubauer, the court cites Squaw Valley for the proposition
that ski lifts have the status of a common carrier.9 Squaw Valley
is distinguishable from the facts of the instant case. The ski lifts
in Squaw Valley are used to transport skiers from the base of the
mountain to the ski areas on top, and occassionally back down the
mountain, for a ticket price. The purpose of the lifts are for trans-
portation from point A to point B, and not to entertain the patron
during the ascent. In contrast, the Pirates of the Caribbean boats
carry passengers along a circular route. The passengers depart
from a loading and unloading dock and return to the same dock.
These passengers unquestionably are on the boat ride for en-
tertainment, not transportation. Moreover, they do not pay a sep-
arate fee for riding Pirates of the Caribbean. As the above-
mentioned cases illustrate, amusement park rides are purely en-
tertainment devices and, therefore, should not be treated as
carriers.
B. Private v. Common Carriers
Other jurisdictions distinguish between private and common
carriers. For example, the Connecticut Court of Appeals in Hunt
v. Clifford ° stated "[a] common carrier of passengers undertakes
to carry for hire, indiscriminately, all persons who may apply for
passage, provided there is sufficient space or room available and
no legal excuse exists for refusing to accept them."81 A carrier not
meeting this criteria is deemed a private carrier for hire.
78 Id. at 303-4.
79 Neubauer v. Disneyland, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 672, 673 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
8o 209 A.2d 182 (Conn. 1965).
81 Id. at 183 (quoting 14 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers § 734).
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California likewise distinguishes between common and pri-
vate carriers.82 Common carriers are defined as carriers who un-
dertake to carry from one place to another the goods of all persons
who apply for carriage.83 These carriers are legally obliged to
carry all who apply and may not arbitrarily refuse to carry a par-
ticular passenger. 4 By contrast, private carriers for hire carry
goods and passengers on their own terms and do not publicly rep-
resent that they will carry all who apply for carriage. 5 In other
words, private carriers do not undertake to carry all passengers
indiscriminately. This common law distinction is relevant be-
cause common carriers are charged with the utmost duty of dili-
gence and care, while private carriers need only meet the ordinary
negligence standard of reasonable care.86 Under this distinction,
it is wrong to impute the higher level of care on private carriers.
As stated by the California Supreme Court, "[T]he law applicable
to common carriers is peculiarly rigorous, and it ought not to be
extended to persons [or businesses] who have not expressly as-
sumed that character ... .",87 The Neubauer opinion does not men-
tion the traditional common law distinction between common and
private carriers.
In Webster v. Ebright, s the California Court of Appeal held a
horse stable which provided horses and guided tours on trails was
bound only by the ordinary negligence standard of reasonable
care.89 The court articulated a difference between a common car-
rier and a private carrier for hire: "A common carrier under
82 Webster v. Ebright, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 714, 716-17 (Ct. App. 1992).
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id., see also Carpena v. County of Los Angeles, 7 Cal. Rptr. 889, 891 (Ct. App. 1960)
(operator of prison bus was held to be acting at most as a private carrier and "certainly was
required to exercise no more than ordinary care and prudence"); Hopkins v. Yellow Cab Co.,
114 Cal. App. 2d 394 (1952) (cab company ceased being a common carrier and became a
private carrier, held to a duty of ordinary care, when it transported disabled children to
and from school at designated hours); Shannon v. Central-Gaither U. School Dist., 133 Cal.
App. 124 (1933) (operator of a school bus used by a particular school was held a private
carrier under a duty of ordinary prudence); Gorstein v. Priver, 64 Cal. App. 249, 254 (1923)
(owner of a truck rented out on weekends was held a private carrier and thus bound to a
duty of ordinary care). But see Lopez v. Southern Calif. Rapid Transit Dist., 710 P.2d 907
(Cal. 1985). There, the defendant, a municipal transit corporation, argued that even
though it was a common carrier, it was nonetheless immune from tort liability under the
California Government Code. In the opinion, the court held a duty of utmost care applies to
"public carriers as well as private carriers." Id. at 909. However, as Webster noted, the
Lopez court meant "private carriers" in the sense of "nongovernmental common carriers"
when it rejected the defendant's argument that a duty of utmost care should not apply to
governmental common carriers. Webster, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 719. This intent is evidenced by
the court's own restatement of its holding: "In summary, we hold that Civil Code section
2100 imposes upon all common carriers-public or private-a duty of utmost care and dili-
gence . .. ." Id. at 914 (emphasis added).
87 Samuelson v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 227 P.2d 256, 36 Cal. 2d 722, 730 (1951).
88 Webster, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 714.
89 Id.
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§ 2168 is one who offers to the general public to carry goods or
persons, and is bound to accept anyone who tenders the price of
carriage."90 Conversely, a private carrier is bound only to carry
passengers pursuant to a special agreement.91 Although the facts
of this case are similar to those in McIntyre, the court reached an
opposite result.s2
The Neubauer court relied on McIntyre in ruling amusement
park rides are common carriers.93 However, the McIntyre court
did not address the issue of private carrier liability.94 The primary
issue considered by the court was whether the mule train consti-
tuted a carrier at all.95 The court narrowly held the ranch stable
entered into a contract of carriage and therefore the trial court
erred by refusing common carrier jury instructions.9 6
The court in Neubauer should have applied the holding of
Webster to its analysis of common carrier liability in California.
Indeed, the court should have addressed the critical distinction be-
tween common and private carriers. If these factors had been con-
sidered by the court, a different result should have been reached.
Disneyland, Inc. is a private corporation which is not legally man-
dated to indiscriminately carry all public passengers on its rides.
Disneyland has the right to refuse carriage, to set height or weight
limits, and to displace a passenger from a ride or the entire park
at its discretion. When California's common carrier statute is in-
terpreted in light of the traditional California common law, Dis-
neyland should be treated as a private carrier with a duty of
ordinary care. Furthermore, unlike a common carrier, many of
the rides at Disneyland discriminate based on physical require-
ments and medical conditions.
C. Perceived Risk of Danger
In Lamb v. B & B Amusement Corp.," the Utah Supreme
Court held a roller coaster operator was not subject to common
carrier liability. In distinguishing common carriers from amuse-
ment rides, the court stated:
Persons using ordinary transportation devices, such as eleva-
tors and buses, normally expect to be carried safely, securely,
and without incident to their destination .... Persons who use
9o Id. at 715-16.
91 Id. at 716.
92 Id. at 720.
93 Neubauer v. Disneyland, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 672, 673 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
94 The ranch stables maintained it was not a "carrier" in the general sense and the
issue on appeal was not whether the stable was a private versus a common carrier. McIn-
tyre v. Smoke Tree Ranch Stables, 23 Cal. Rptr. 339, 342 (Ct. App. 1962).
95 Id. at 339-42.
96 Id. at 341.
97 869 P.2d 926 (Utah 1993).
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amusement rides have different expectations. Passengers on
many amusement rides expect entertainment in the form of
high speeds, steep drops, and tight turns. There are, of course,
many kinds of amusement rides, and patrons who use those
rides must, to some extent, be aware of their own physical abili-
ties and limitations and exercise some judgment as to their abil-
ity to endure the physical and mental stresses encountered on
various rides. Amusement rides are not designed to provide
comfortable, uneventful transportation, even when the equip-
ment operates without incident and as intended.98
Some Disneyland rides have posted signs warning of the in-
herent risks and patrons must be aware of their own physical lim-
itations and exercise judgment as to their ability to endure the
physical and mental stresses potentially encountered. However,
the majority of the rides, such as Peter Pan's Flight, It's a Small
World, the Haunted Mansion and Pirates of the Caribbean, are
innocuous excursions in which persons of every age may ride com-
fortably. An illogical result would exist if these rides are consid-
ered common carriers, while holding the park's roller coasters are
not common carriers because of the perceived risks. This variety
in the types of amusement rides underscores the problem with
Neubauer's broad holding that amusement park rides are per se
common carriers as defined by California's common carrier
statute.
D. Legislative Intent
The California Supreme Court has held the "objective of stat-
utory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative in-
tent."99 When this intent cannot be discerned directly from the
plain language of the statute, or the language is susceptible to
more than one reasonable interpretation, courts should "look to a
variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be
achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public
policy .... and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a
part."1 
°°
In Neubauer, the court stated, "[a] reasonable argument can
be made that common carrier status should not apply to an
amusement park ride because it is not the traditional kind of
'transportation' historically contemplated by the common carrier
theory, with the main purpose being entertainment rather than
travel."10 1 However, the court made no further attempt to consider
extrinsic aids in its analysis.
98 Lamb, 869 P.2d at 930-31.
99 People v. Woodhead, 239 Cal. Rptr. 656, 658 (Cal. 1987).
loo Id.
lol Neubauer v. Disneyland, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 672, 673 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
1998]
Chapman Law Review
California's common carrier statute was enacted in 1872. At
that time, the primary sources of transportation were horses,
stagecoaches, steamboats, and railways. Legislation was enacted
to regulate the new transportation era. Arguably, the intent was
to provide safety in transportation, not entertainment. After all,
the first roller coaster in the United States was not in operation
until 1884. The first Ferris wheel was introduced in Chicago in
1893.102 California's first amusement park opened for business at
Santa Cruz in 1904.103 This history bolsters the argument that
traditional modes of transportation such as railways and stage-
coaches were the intended objects of the common carrier stat-
ute, °4 and any problems associated with amusement rides were
not the evils to be remedied.
The question that arises is whether it is fair to apply a stat-
ute, that has not been amended by the California Legislature
since its enactment 125 years ago, to amusement park rides. The
judiciary should refrain from expanding a definition to include en-
tertainment devices that were not contemplated by the those who
enacted the common carrier statute of 1872. The legislature
should widen the door, not the courts.
E. Ordinary Negligence Will Suffice
Certainly, a court may feel constrained to impose a high de-
gree of liability upon the operators of roller coasters and similar
rides which seemingly defy gravity and centrifugal forces. These
rides lunge forward at great speeds maneuvering up, down, over
and around as they impose pressure on the body and excite the
mind. Yet a court need not use the common carrier status to im-
pose a higher duty of care on amusement park operators.
Ordinary negligence concepts protect the patrons of roller
coasters and similar "high risk" amusement rides. There is no
need to distort the meaning of "common carrier" to reach such a
result. Indeed, the common law recognizes that an operator's duty
must be in proportion to the apparent risk.'0° As the risk in-
creases, so does the duty of care."0 ' In the words of Prosser and
Keaton:
102 National Amusement Park Historical Association, <http:l www.napha.org> (1998).
103 Charles Hillinger, Time Warp: Boardwalk Recalls Era when Life Was A Beach, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 27, 1989, at Metro 1.
104 See generally Champagne v. A. Hamburger & Sons, 147 P. 954 (Cal. 1915) (the
California Supreme Court analogized passenger elevators to railways and stagecoaches);
Forsyth v. San Joaquin Light & Power Corp., 281 P. 620 (Cal. 1929) (California Supreme
Court noted the Auto Stage and Truck Transportation Act of 1917 in which transportation
modes covered under the Act were defined as any automobile, jitney bus, auto truck, stage
or auto stage).
105 PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 34, at 208.
106 See John Kimpflen, Duties and Liabilities as to Amusement Rides and Devices, 27A
Am. Jur. 2d Entertainment and Sports Law § 90, at 455 (1996) ("The measure or amount of
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If the risk is an appreciable one, and the possible consequences
are serious, the question is not one of mathematical probability
alone. The odds may be a thousand to one that no train will
arrive at the very moment that an automobile is crossing a rail-
way track, but the risk of death is nevertheless sufficiently seri-
ous to require the driver to look for the train and the train to
signal the approach. It may be highly improbable that lightning
will strike at any given place or time; but the possibility is there,
and it may require precautions for the protection of inflam-
mables. As the gravity of the possible harm increases, the ap-
parent likelihood of its occurrence need be correspondingly less
to generate a duty of precaution. °7
The duty of care will vary according to the risks inherent in a
particular amusement park ride. Operators of such rides will be
held liable accordingly. Expanding and stretching the definition
of the 1872 common carrier statute is not necessary given the neg-
ligence theories already in place. It is patently unfair to hold the
operators of amusement rides strictly liable to a heightened duty
of utmost care and diligence simply because of a statute written
125 years in the past.
V. CONCLUSION
The significance of Neubauer lies in the broad construction
the court attached to the California statute defining common car-
riers. The court's formalistic, textual interpretation of this statute
goes against existing California precedence, case law around the
country, and the spirit of statutory interpretation. Moreover, the
court's decision was unnecessary given the negligence protections
available to potential plaintiffs.
The existing California case law does not support the court's
holding in this case. Disneyland, Inc. is a private corporation and
is not legally mandated to indiscriminately carry all public pas-
sengers on its rides. When California's common carrier statute is
interpreted in light of the common law, Disneyland is perhaps a
private carrier with a duty of ordinary care, but probably is not a
carrier at all.
The Neubauer court relied heavily on McIntyre and Squaw
Valley in holding amusement park rides fall within the statutory
definition of common carriers. The court's determination that ski-
care required will vary according to the hazards involved or the dangers inherent in the
particular ride or device, for where the operating hazard is considerable, more exact super-
vision in its use is required than in cases where there is little or no element of danger. The
owner or operator of the ride or device must use reasonable care to see that it is properly
constructed and designed, maintained, and managed; reasonable care in such respect is
that which an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under like circumstances, and in a
like situation.").
107 PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 31, at 171.
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lifts and mule trains are analogous to amusement park rides is ill-
suited because Neubauer is factually distinguishable from both
McIntyre and Squaw Valley, which involved persons paying a fare
for carriage to a fixed destination.
By way of contrast, Disneyland charges an admission price
pursuant to which a patron may enter the park and engage in a
wide variety of activities ranging from parade and show watching
to riding on roller coasters, all without paying a fee for any specific
ride. Disneyland does not transport its patrons to destinations.
The only thing Disneyland undertakes to do is stimulate imagina-
tions and inspire dreams. Disneyland is in the business of en-
tertainment, and claims to be the happiest place on earth.
Under the court's blanket holding, common carrier status
may be applied to any amusement ride or device. Owners or oper-
ators of train rides at kiddy zoos, and playground slides are con-
ceivably common carriers.
California case law has not yet defined "common carrier" in
light of late twentieth century developments, much less those
reaching into the twenty-first century. As technology speeds
along and new devices are created, the California courts or legisla-
ture may one day draw a line in the sand, limiting the reaches of a
common carrier statute enacted back in the stagecoach era.
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